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Published Online: 23 June 2016
AIP Conference Proceedings 1738, 110002 (2016); https://doi.org/10.1063/1.4951871
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In this paper, we consider a competition between a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm, supposing that the production processes generates environmental pollution. Introducing the residents’ environmental preference into the public firm’s objective function, we analyse its economic impacts. We also analyse the economic impacts of the privatization.
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